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PREFACE 
This is one of a set of three working papers concerned with 
the System and Decision Sciences task on Institutional Aspects 
of Risk Management. 
Even a cursory comparison of the way the same technological 
risks are handled reveals that things get done differently in 
different countries. And, within any one country, the debate 
about how to improve the handling of those risks is often a 
debate between the advocates of several of these different 
ways of doing things. 
To understand these differences we need to develop a 
cultural theory about the appropriateness and the credibility 
of risk-handling institutions. Since to invoke gross differences 
between national cultures would be to ignore the polarized 
debates within each nation, we need rather the idea of cultural 
bias - the contradictory prerIilectionsr ideas of nature, and 
personal strategies to which different individuals in the same 
society can adhere. In this way the cultural approach goes 
beyond the comparative study of institutions to investigate 
the social processes responsible for the ebb and flow of support 
between alternative institutional frameworks. 
The first paper - Political Culture: an Introduction - 
provides some of the intuitive background for this approach. 
The second paper - An Outline of the Cultural Theory of Risk - 
gives a more formal treatment of this cultural theory as it 
emerges in the particular context with which we are concerned: 
risk. The third paper - Beyond Self-Interest: A Cultural 
Analysis of a Risk Debate - is an attempt to apply this theory 
to one of the case studies currently being assembled by the 
Management and Technology group that is investigating the ways 
in which the risks inherent in Liquid Energy Gases are handled 
in the process of terminal siting. 
POLITICAL CULTURE: 
AN INTRODUCTION 
Michael Thompson 
THE BARE BONES 
Perhaps the greatest achievement of anthropology has been 
to show that different people, faced with the same situation, 
do different things. No sooner does an economist, a psychologist, 
a sociologist or a political scientist produce his universally 
valid model of some aspect of human behavior than an anthropolo- 
gist will jump up and say, "Ah, but what about the Bongo-bongo?" 
It is probably safe to say that there is no universalistic pro- 
position that is immune to Bongo-bongoism. ' Some semiologists , 
for instance, have suggested that there are some signs so 
rooted in nature that their meaning has to be intrinsic. One 
such sign is the arrow: . Here, surely, the meaning is 
intrinsic to the sign; arrows always fly through the air point 
first and so the point of the sign, surely, must always indicate 
the direction of travel. Quite so, but who said the sign was an 
arrow? On a remote island in Elicronesia the people spend much 
of their time hunting a secretive bird whose feet are specially 
adapted to the marshy terrain. Each time it puts one of its 
three-toed feet down on the ground, it leaves a sign: +: and 
every time a hunter sees one of these signs, he knows with 
certainty which way to go to catch up with his quarry. He goes 
in the direction indicated by the big central toe! 
Anthropologists have been so carried away by their spoil- 
sport success that they have almost lost sight of the one really 
interesting question which is: given that different people in 
the same sort of situation do different things, why do they do 
the different things that they do? This is the question that 
political culture tries to answer. If it was only the people 
on remote Micronesian islands who did things differently then 
political culture, whilst intellectually intriguing, would be of 
little practical relevance but, though we might like to pretend 
otherwise, this is not the case. The simple but unpalatable fact 
is that the Bongo-bongo are alive and well and living right here 
in our midst. 
More than a century ago General Booth, the founder of the 
Salvation Army, after describing the iniquities perpetrated by 
the slave traders in the unknown African interior, suddenly 
brought the whole outrage uncomfortabl close to home and asked: 
"Is there not also a darkest England?'r In much the same way, 
political culture brings the Bongo-bongo home to roost; the only 
difference is that this time it is our rationality, not our 
morality, that is outraged.3 
The trick with political culture is to come at policy- 
relevant debates, such as those that surround technological 
risk or non-renewable energy resources from a contrary direction. 
Instead of asking "what are the risks?" or "how much oil and gas 
is there down there?" it has us ask "what would you like the 
risks to be?", "how much oil and gas would you like there to be 
down there?" Though political culture has something useful to 
contribute to all public policy analysis, its point of entry is 
that state of desperation, exasperation and exhaustion that is 
reached when, after years and years of debate and after the 
expenditure of millions and millions of dollars, we are still 
no nearer agreement on what the risks out there are or on how 
much oil and gas there is down there. 
In the first instance, it is a theory of last resort; when 
all else has failed, try political culture. In the second 
instance, it leads us to ask (rather uneasily) why, in those 
less troubled areas where we all agree, we are all agreed. Could 
it Se, not because we are right, but because we are all party 
to the same delusion? Are we, perhaps, all reading birds' foot- 
prints as arrows and moving in cosy unison ever further from our 
consensual goal?4 
An Unconventional View of Culture 
Though it is commonly assumed that to reject cultural 
universalism is to embrace cultural relativity, this assumption 
would only be valid if the number of different things that people 
could do was infinite. Political culture starts out from the 
intuitive hunch that, though people faced with the same situation 
do different things, there aretnt that many different ways of 
doing things differently. This idea that there are patterns of 
cuZture,5 that such patterns are accessible and describable, 
and that there are not very many of them is not a synthesis of 
the universalistic and relativistic traditions; it is a rejection 
of them both. It is as well to make this point explicit right 
at the beginning. Political culture is born of the marriage of 
anthropology to political science and culture is its key-concept, 
but the idea of culture that underpins this approach is far 
removed from the ideas that have held conventional sway in 
anthropology. 
Ruth Benedict, whose seminal book was entitled "Patterns 
of Culture," is probably the most important ancestor in this 
political culture tradition and many of her ideas are still 
visible (to the eye of faith, at any rate) in what follows. Just 
as the sound and fury generated by the contradiction of 
behaviorism and mentalism has tended to direct attention away 
from any formulation that suggests that they are both inadequate, 
and just as the mutual antagonism of institutional and neo- 
classical economics has inhibited the development of any mature 
approach that would reveal these polarised positions for what 
they really are - ideologically-committed statements of how the 
world should be, rather than accounts of how it is - so the 
patterns of culture tradition has always tended to be submerged 
in the turbulence set up between the universalists and the 
relativists. As we bring this submerged tradition to the surface, 
what features do we begin to discern? 
We start to lose interest in those vague pseudo-entities 
like American culture or French culture; instead we start to 
focus on the various c u l t u r a l  b i a s e s  that are to be found (in 
varying proportions) within both American society and French 
society. Nor do we persist in our sympathy for either of those 
contradictory formulations that would have us believe, on the one 
hand, that culture is just some kind of reflection or rationalisa- 
tion of social action, and on the other hand, that culture is 
some kind of rule-book for the game of social life that gets 
handed down, largely unchanged, from generation to generation. 
Culture, we begin to feel, conforms to neither of these contra- 
dictory extremes of total fluidity and rigid concreteness. 
Culture is plastic. Though it can be pushed this way and it can 
be pushed that way, it cannot be pushed just anywhere; and just 
to push it into some freshattainable configuration (and then 
keep it there) requires a great deal of social effort. Instead 
of a lot of social actors programmed day-in-day-out by culture 
and instead of some cultural superstructure that forms like a 
fluffy cloud above the granite mountain of production and con- 
sumption forces, we have mentally and physically creative 
individuals for whom culture is a rather provisional thing that 
needs to be made (or, at the very least, patched-up and modified) 
afresh each morning. 
So the idea behind the political culture approach is that 
there are only a few shareable (i.e., socially viable) cultural 
biases and that (in advanced industrial societies, at any rate) 
it would be most unwise to assume that any of these possible 
biases are "uninhabited." Each bias is stabilized, albeit 
precariously, by its distinctive cosmology6.  By cosmology is 
meant those shared beliefs and convictions about how the world 
is that sustain and justify moral judgements. But, if shared 
beliefs and convictions are rather provisional things that have 
to be worked at all the time, how can you be sure that your's 
are in line with everyone else's? Only by engaging in the 
continual process in which each individual justifies his own 
actions and passes judgement on those of others can you become, 
and remain, a member of a moral community. "Giving a good account 
of yourself" is not just a figure of speech; it is the human 
propensity that makes human society possible. 
The final piece of the political culture jig-saw is s o c i a l  
c o n t e x t  for it is an individual's social context, so the theory 
runs, that determines his particular cultural bias and leads him 
to give credence to one cosmology - to one set of shareable beliefs 
about how the world is - rather than to any of the contradictory 
alternatives. And finally, social context it is held is -, 
adequately described by just two dimensions - group ,  which has 
to do with the extent to which the individual is involved in 
bounded social groups, and g r i d ,  which has to do with the extent 
to which the individual is involved in hierarchical arrangements 
(either of individuals or of bounded groups of individuals). 
It is these three concepts - c u l t u r e  analysed not for itself 
but for its bias, cosmoZogy that renders viable one or other of 
a small number of irreconcilable ideas of how the world is, and 
s o c i a l  c o n t e x t  which furnishes the s e l e c t i o n  r u l e s  that tell us 
which particular cosmology an individual will be predisposed to 
find credible out of this l e x i c o n  - that provide political culture 
with its seemingly contrary orientation. 
If you are convinced that the world is like this, and I am 
convinced that the world is like that, then we are likely to act 
in very different ways in the one physical world that we both 
inhabit. That is, people who subscribe to contradictory 
cosmologies will operate contradictory rationalities. Each, 
ensnared in his own provincial rationality, will see the others 
as the Bongo-bongo (Lord ~othschild,~ for instance, sees the 
Friends of the Earth as weco-nutsn and "eco-maniacs" and they 
for their part see him as something quite unprintable). Since 
each is committed to the rightness of his own cosmology, none 
of them can let go of it long enough to concede the validity of 
the others' rationalities. In the acrimonious battle between 
these rationalities no one can afford to stand outside it to 
compile the lexicon and to unravel its associated selection rules; 
to do that would be to concede the validity of other rationalities 
and to admit that any approach aimed at determining which 
rationality is right is bound to be wrong, and the whole mis- 
guided purpose of the battle is not to live with the Bongo-bongo 
but to annihilate them. 
Political culture is the systematic deprovincialisation 
of rationality. If individuals in different social contexts 
are firmly attached to contradictory convictions about how the 
world is, then it is only to be expected that they will have very 
different ideas of what the risks out there are and that they 
will have very different estimation; as to just how much oil and 
gas there is down there. To ask "who is right?" is not just 
to ask a question that probably only history can answer; it is 
to encourage the arbitrary tyranny of one provincial rationality 
over all the others. It is in order both to avoid asking such 
uglyquest2ons and to transcend such narrow provincialism that we 
ask instead "what would you like the risks to be?" and "how 
much would you like there to be down there?" 
All this - the bare theoretical bones of the political 
culture approach - will not begin to make much sense until the 
flesh and blood of worked examples has been added to it, but at 
least this brief display of its formal skeleton of assumptions 
should serve one purpose and that is to make clear the integrative 
ambition of the unconventional theory on which it rests. 
SOME FLESH AND BLOOD: MOUNTAINEERING, SMOKING AND NUCLEAR POWER 
In November 1979, I attended a meeting of an essentially 
pronuclear group in America - Scientists and ~ngineers for 
Secure Energy (SE2). The meeting was concerned with two topics - 
the safe disposal of nuclear waste and the Three Mile Island 
accident. In a sense the meeting was, for me, a kind of field- 
work - a valuable insight into one side of the nuclear debate - 
and my reaction was part critical, part sympathetic and part 
practical in that I offered some small pieces of advice as to how 
they might better advance their cause. I should hasten to add 
that I do not see myself as being in any particular camp - pro- 
or anti-nuclear- and that I would welcome the chance of talking 
with other interested agencies (the Friends of the Earth, say, 
or various government departments) and of making helpful 
suggestions to them as well. 
[Now if these suggestions are not mutually contradictory, 
and I would claim that they are not, then it follows that each 
conflicting position has its part to play. It suggests that no 
rationality is absolutely right and no rationality is absolutely 
wrong. Rather, each is more or less appropriate to various kinds 
of situation. Political culture, in providing some bases for 
making prescriptions (for that is what these "helpful suggestions" 
are), aims to help each rationality to play its part. To speak 
of divergent elements playing their different parts, and to speak 
of possible parts as being appropriate or inappropriate, is to 
assume that there exists one or more optimal configurations of 
those elements at which the welfare of the totality reaches some 
maximum. The description of such optima is one of the ultimate 
goals of political culture.] 
To those who have accused me, nevertheless, of being some 
sort of hired gun for the nuclear movement I should further 
add that all my helpful suggestions have gone unheeded!8 
The Paralysis of Institutions 
The technical presentations at the meeting served the 
useful purpose of showing that, so far as the members of SE2 
are concerned, there need be no fear that the problems of dlsposal 
are insuperable. What is more, two countries (Sweden and France) 
have, by going firm on one good (but not necessarily the best) 
method of disposal, gamed political acceptance that this is so. 
The Swedish example - both their technical report and its 
political acceptance - should have been more than sufficient for 
us all to have agreed that the obstacles cannot be technical - 
they must be political. Yet, time and again during the meeting, 
the irrelevancies of glass versus ceramic, granite versus salt .... 
reprocessing versus not reprocessing reappeared in the discussion. 
The European who sees the technically excellent New Mexico 
pilot project invalidated by the U.S. military's refusal to bury 
its dead in a civilian cemetery,g and who watches distinguished 
scientists niggling over the claimed virtues of glass and ceramics 
e v e n  a f t e r  t h e y  have  a g r e e d  t h a t  s u c h  n i g g l i n g  o n l y  a l l o w s  t h e  
o p p o s i t i o n  t o  c r e d i b l y  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  e x p e r t s  c a n n o t  a g r e e  on  a  
s a f e  m e t h o d  o f  d i s p o s a l ,  cannot but feel exasperation at America's 
refusal to reach a decision. Like an obese child confronted with 
a table loaded with goodies, Americaseemsincapable of choosing, 
not because it has no choice, but because it is spoilt for choice. 
But no man (and no obese child either) is an island, and the 
European should give vent to his irritation only for so long as 
it takes to get it out of his system. When America sneezes the 
whole world catches cold, and when America is racked with in- 
decision the whole world becomes a much more dangerous place. 
America's current lack of any coherent policy for secure energy 
is turning almost any event into a crisis. 
So, having put one's irritation to one side, one is faced 
with two crucial questions. First, what is the cause of America's 
institutional paralysis? Second, what if anything can be done 
about it? Before tackling these two questions, let me clear 
the ground a little. First, in the light of the Swedish example, 
and of the considered debate among SE2's experts, technical 
considerations are irrelevant. The search for the cause of the 
paralysis and for its cure should therefore be concentrated wholly 
within the social and political realm. Second, the institutions 
that are supposed to provide America with decisions (and with 
good decisions, to boot) fail to do so, not because there is 
something wrong with the institutions themselves, but because 
the institutions have lost the support of many individuals within 
contemporary American society. Institutions are not just t h e r e  - 
they flourish or wither according to whether they do or do not 
enjoy the credibility of the members of the society that created 
them. Almost all the suggestions that were made at the meeting 
involved doing something to the institutions - pointing out what 
they s h o u l d  be doing in contrast to what they a r e  doing, improving 
management and communication ... urging paraplegics to snap out of 
it! These I regard, not as solutions, but as accurate descrip- 
tions of what is wrong. They contrast what the situation should 
be, if the institutions were able to work properly, with the sorry 
state to which they are now reduced. They are diagnosis disguised 
as cure. Telling the institutions that they are not doing what 
they were designed to do will, miracles excepted, meet with about 
as much success as commanding the man sick of the palsy to take 
up his bed and walk. 
Since the crisis is that the institutions c a n ' t  do what 
they are supposed to do, there is little to be gained from 
trying to influence them directly, but this does not mean that 
we can do nothing to alter the situation. We may not be able 
to change the institutions but we may be able to change the 
people. 
The institutions are paralysed because public opinion is 
polarized. Even an institutional procedure like the Kemeny 
Commission, that is specifically designed to resolve such a 
polarization, ends up by itself falling victira to it. At our 
meeting we learnt from one of the members of the Commission about 
the split within its ranks and we lost no time in extracting 
from him just how tlie proposal for a moratorium was introduced 
by theanti-nuclear faction. I have no doubt that in some other 
meeting some other member of the Commission was spilling the 
correspondingbeans about the pro-nuclear faction. I made this 
perhaps distasteful point in order to suggest that there is a 
very real sense in which we in SE2, in exacerbating this polar- 
ization within American society, are actually the cause of the 
very problem we are committed to trying to resolve. I suggested 
that at least we considered this as a possibility, and that we 
asked ourselves what constructive steps we could take if it 
were true. 
Anthropology's Contribution 
Different people may perceive risks differently and, of 
those risks that they perceive, they may vary quite considerably 
in the level they deem to be acceptable. 
If two individuals happen to be at opposite ends of both 
these modes of variation - one perceiving only short-term risks, 
the other perceiving only long-term risks, one accepting a high 
level of risk, the other a low level of risk - then their beha- 
vior in the same situation will be widely divergent. Yet each 
will be acting perfectly rationally. Since the great claim that 
is always made for anthropology is that it deprovincializes 
rationality, the anthropologist should be able to offer an 
explanation for such variations in risk perception and in risk 
acceptability. 
The field in which I first began to look at these questions 
was not nuclear power but Himalayan mountaineering - an activity 
in which those who partake, Western climbers and Nepalese Sherpas, 
cheerfully and voluntarily expose themselves to enormous risks.10 
It is, in fact, quite easy to compute what these risks are (the 
likelihood of death is in the order of 1 in 10 per expedition) 
but climbers and Sherpas go to some trouble not to discover what 
they are. There can be no doubt that the best way not to lose 
any sleep over the risks you are taking is to make sure that you 
remain blissfully ignorant of their existence. Ignorance, for 
them, is not simply the absence of knowledge - it is a deliberatly 
cultivated condition. 
For the Sherpas, social and cultural institutions such as 
principles of inheritance whereby each son and daughter gets his 
or her share at the time when they decide they would like to set 
up on their own, propzrty rights whereby on divorce the common 
property is split along the same lines as it was merged, and an 
insistence upon not mentioning the names of the dead all serve to 
render credible a belief in economic individualism, personal 
salvation, private morality, and an ideal of neither squeezing 
others norallowingoneself to be squeezed. Such institutions 
militate against the construction of long time perspectives which, 
by ernphasising historical and genealogical connections, would 
allow some members and groups to press strong claims against 
others. The result is that time perspectives are severely 
truncated and only short term risks are perceived with any 
clarity. 
Western climbers similarly lay great emphasis on personal 
mountaineering skill, judgement and experience in order to con- 
vince themselves that, though the risks in general may be high, 
the risks they themselves are exposed to are less and are within 
their own control. Most deaths, in fact, result from objective 
dangers - if you are in the path of an avalanchewhen it comes 
down you are dead regardless of your skill, judgement and 
experience.11 
So Eimalayan mountaineering provides examples of people under- 
estimating the risks, especially the long-term rislrs. For ther-;, 
almost anything is safe enough. By contrast, the near neighbours 
of the Buddhist Sherpas are Eindu villagers who would n e v e r  go 
on a Himalayan expedition.12 Where the Sherpas are individualistic, 
egalitarian and omnivorous, their neighbours are grouped into 
joint families with their commonly held land in the control of 
an elderly head, they are much concerned with hierarchy, status 
and purity, and they insist on all sorts of dietary and other 
prescriptions. Where the Buddhist Sherpas are entrepreneurial 
risk-takers, their Hindu neighbours are stay-at-home risk-avoiders. 
The Sherpas free-and-easy expansive style of wealth creation 
contrasts sharply with the carefully tended fields and the 
close-knit face-to-face communities of their neighbours as they 
go about the husbanding of resources that they perceive tc be 
fixed and finite. If the Sherpas resemble 'the savage beasts of 
capitalism,' their neighbours constitute a sort of oriental 
Sierra Club. Why the variation? 
The conventional anthropological answer is that individuals 
are guided in their choice between risk-accepting and risk-avoiding 
strategies by their world views - their culture. A more radical 
hypothesis accepts this but goes on to suggest that both chosen 
strategy and culture are, in turn, closely related to the social 
context that an individual finds himself in. Since an individual's 
social context can be changed, either by his own efforts or by the 
actions of his fellows, it follows that his culture and his 
chosen strategy may also change. It is at this point that the 
anthropology of risk begins to acquire practical implications. 
The Hindu adopts a risk-sharing strategy, and subscribes 
to the pessimistic all-embracing world view that justifies such 
a strategy, because he has someone to share with. The Buddhist 
adopts a risk-narrowing strategy, and subscribes to the optimistic 
piecemeal world view that justifies such a strategy, because he 
has no one to share with. Social context is enormous l y  persuasive. 
If there is no one there to share your risks with you, you cannot 
go in for risk-sharing and,conversely, only a mug would take a 
huge personal risk knowing that, if he was successful, he would 
have to share the rewards among all his risk-shunning fellows. 
So here is one social dimension of risk perception and risk 
acceptability. In the strongly individualised context of the 
Buddhist many risks go unperceived and, of those that are 
perceived, many are acceptable. In the collectivised context of 
the Hindu many more risks are perceived (including many that 
a r e n ' t  there) and few of these are acceptable. There is something 
intuitively attractive about these Himalayan vignettes and they 
provide some uncanny parallels with America's current predicament. 
Could it be that many Americans have over the last decade or so 
been converted, so to speak, from Buddhism to Hinduism? 
From Anthropology to Political Science 
A more recent research project has been concerned with the 
detailed investigation of this collectivised context - a com- 
parative study of an 'anti' movement (the anti-smoking movement) 
in both the United States and Britain. The first thing t0 
notice about 'anti' groups is that they are groups. Their 
members have surrendered some of their individuality in order to 
present a unified collectivised front on some issues. But the 
interesting thing is that, though the social contexts of the 
members are, in consequence, all towards the. collectivised pole 
on this first dimension of social context, they are spread out 
at right angles to it along a second dimension - that running 
from the high level of prescription that is imposed upon the 
members of a hierarchical internally structured group to the 
absence of prescription that characterises a tightly-bounded but 
internally undifferentiated, and therefore egalitarian, group. 
These two kinds cf group are well known to anthropology; they 
correspond to castes and sects respectively. 
Jumping ahead to the model for a moment, it may be helpful 
to interpose one of its basic diagrams at this point. This 
diagram is simply the two social context dimensions with five 
stabilizable equilibria superimposed on them. We can then label 
two of these as the contexts occupied by individuals who are 
members of castes and sects respectively (and we can also tenta- 
tively label the context appropriate to the savage beasts of 
capitalism). Though we will not meet them again until we get 
to the next paper - An O u t l i n e  o f  t h e  CuZturaZ T h e o r y  o f  R i s k  - 
we can take this opportunity to tentatively fill in the remaining 
two contexts. 
The top left context is where we find the social condition 
immortalized by Durkheim - a n o m i e .  Very alone and everywhere 
hedged about by externally imposed prescriptions, the individual 
in this context has little control over events in time and space 
and his (or her, since women tend to predominate in this context) 
cosmology tends to be cobbled together from such ill-assorted 
bits and pieces as he can lay his hands on. This is the social 
context of k i t s c h ,  of millenarianism, of inconsistent eclecticism 
and, above all, of Lady Luck as the provider and withholder of 
all resources. ~ n ~ e l s , l ~  in his account of the condition of the 
un-unionisedworkingclasses in Victorian Britain, is describing 
this context and so too (though with a slightly different set of 
prescriptions in mind) is Mrs. ~askelll~ when she speaks of those 
for whom 'life is like a lottery.' 
The fifth context is the one that is often missed by 
occidental social scientists; it is the distinctive context 
occupied by the individual who has deliberately chosen to keep 
his involvement in socially-binding relationships (be they net- 
work or group relationships) to a minimum. This is the social 
context of the hermit - the still centre of the social hurricane 
(but not those raucous North American pseudo-hermits, like 
Thoreau-who are really sect-leaders in search of followers). Nor 
are such individuals always o u t s i d e  of society. Though they may 
choose to withdraw from all social involvement, it is only 
c o e r c i v e  involvement that they have to avoid to stabilize them- 
selves in this context. Whole convivial societies can be 
stabilized around this context with the help of its live-and-let- 
live, sufficient-into-the-day-is-the-evil-thereof, cosmology. In 
labelling the Sherpas 'savage beasts of capitalism' I have done 
many of them an injustice for, though such forceful individuals 
do exist in this society, the most prevalent context is not that 
of the e n t r e p r e n e u r  but of the autonomous individual. 
However, it is a fact that these two contexts are not too 
easily kept apart. The individualistic opportunistic Sherpa, 
given the opportunity, can soon turn himself into a savage beast 
of capitalism whilst such few members of this endangered species 
as survive in the West often dream of abandoning it all to sit 
hour after hour beside that trout stream in Hampshire. Just 
about the only thing that keeps these contexts apart is the 
presence or absence of economies of scale. It is the economies 
of scale that the savage beast of capitalism has exploited that 
keep him from his trout stream and it is the paucity of opportu- 
nities for economies of scale in their Himalayan habitat that 
prevents most Sherpas frcm turning into carnivores. (Figure 1) 
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Figure 1. Stabilizable conjunctions of social context and 
cosmology 
A s e c t  erects a wall of virtue between itself and the nasty 
outside world from which it wishes to set itself apart. The 
members collectively r e j e c t  the outside world - they do not 
negotiate any sort of relationship with it. The result is that, 
though the collectivity may exercise almost total control over 
its members, it can do nothing to the rest of the society. 
A c a s t e  separates itself off, not with a wall of virtue, 
but by means of clearly defined distinctions between it and those 
other groupings that exist outside it. The result, as each 
caste defines itself by its distinction from (yet clearly 
specified inter-relation with) other castes, is a complex 
hierarchical framework of status distinctions, prescriptions, 
restrictive practices, correct channels, and proper procedures. 
The members of a caste, therefore, do not reject the outside 
world; they collectively take up a clearly specified position 
w i t h i n  it. A caste, as a result, can come to exercise a high 
level of control over its own members and  over those outside its 
boundary. 
Though this fundamental distinction between sects and castes 
originates in anthropology, it has now been developed to the 
point where it connects with similar distinctions that are drawn 
in fields as diverse as organizational theory, political science, 
the sociology of knowledge, dynamical systems modelling, the 
philosophy of science,and the sociology of religion.ls The 
following table (Table 1) lists some of the operetionalizable 
criteria that can be used to deternine whether a group is a sect 
or a caste. 
Table 1. Criteria for separating castes and sects. 
CASTES SECTS 
Dominant Criterion 
Multi-issue aim. 
Secondary Criteria 
1. Membership: 
~uality 
2. Internal Organization: 
Differentiated and hier- 
archical 
3. Relation to Outside: 
Negotiated and clearly- 
specified relationships 
4. Power: 
Manipulates others (collectively). 
5. Stability: 
l7ollows collectivist 
manipulative strategy that 
tends to maintain its 
position on 'peak of power.' 
Mature castes inherently 
stable. 
6. Leadership: 
Many different levels, each 
highly specialized, provide 
clear multi-stepped career 
structures. Leaders tend 
to be mobile within these 
structures. 
Single issue ain. 
Quantity 
Homogeneous and egalitarian 
opposition and rejection 
(unnegotiated) 
Is manipulated 
Follows collectivist survival 
strategy consistent with its 
situation; adopt~s hit-and-run 
tactics. Cannot mature and is 
inherently unstable; cannot abide 
compromise 
Problematical - leaders contradict 
egalitarian ideal. Maintain them- 
selves by maintaining the wall 
of virtue - by constantly re- 
affirming group values, attacking 
those on the outside, spotting 
outsiders who have crept in un- 
detected. No career structure 
so leaders are immobile. 
7. Order: 
The basis of morality, 
hence rejection of dis- 
orderly bodies, e.g., sects. 
Formal and elaborate 
structures. High level of 
prescription and elaborate 
rules. 
8. Commitment: 
Expressed in ritual and in 
adherence to correct pro- 
cedures and proper channels. 
Rejection of outside the basis of 
morality. Inside the wall of 
virtue all is unstructured and 
informal. No prescription or 
rules except those that emphasize 
boundary between inside and 
outside. 
Expressed in collective moral 
fervour,adhocism, and spontaneous 
affirmations of shared opposition 
to the enemy outside. 
9. Scope: 
National or global. If Tends to be local. If there is 
there are local chapters, a central headquarters this 
organization remains creates problems with hierarchy 
stronglycentralized. and may render the organization 
unstable. 
10. Recruitment: 
Not particularly joinable. ~oinable. Open to all who clearly 
Operates by invitation to subscribe to the single aim and 
those who have taken the who reject the outside world. 
trouble to make themselves 
acceptable. 
11. Concern: 
May well be for the welfare Restricted to a minority - those 
of all (though all may not inside the wall of virtue. 
accept that this is so). 
12. Use of scientific knowledge: 
Science respected (especial- Scientific knowledge valued only 
ly scientific method) but if it supports 'us' in fight 
new insights that threaten against 'them' and is accessible 
to confuse existing para- to all. Emphasis on egalitarian 
digms are resisted. The ideal renders specialist and in- 
social context of 'normal accessible knowledge suspect. 
science. ' Scientific method subordinated 
to requirements of boundary 
maintenance. The social context 
of 'scientism'. 
[Note: The sectist use of scientific knowledge, though it 
contrasts so strongly with that of the caste-ist groups, 
is certainly not the source of breakthroughs and para- 
digm change. These are initiated by those prickly 
(5ut brilliant) individuals who, respecting neither 
persons nor disciplinary boundaries and conventions, 
occupy yet another social context - that of the 
entrepreneur - and operate the high risk/high reward 
strategy of the manipulative individualist.] 
One interesting prediction from this model is that, though 
individuals can (by letting their sect loyalty lapse and then 
developing a more caste-ist account of themselves, or v i c e  v e r s a )  
xove between these two context, whole groups cannot. Such a 
prediction is directly counter to the evolutionary sequences 
sometimes advanced in the sociology of religion in which tiny 
persecuted face-to-face sects are depicted as the acorns from 
which the mlghty oak trees of hierarchically-organised established 
churches grow. Instead, it suggests that each is a separate 
species that grows or withers according to the nature of the social 
context soil. Where both appropriatecontextsare found in the 
sanesocietythen massive churches and tiny sects are likely to co- 
exist, the latter providing a continual critical commentary on 
the former. 
The reason why whole groups,be they sects or castes, cannot 
move is that each is stabilized by the collective pursuit of a 
distinct strategy. The members of a caste end up manipulating 
others; the members of a sect end up manipulated by others. 
Because of this divergence between their stabilizing strategies, 
castes and sects always remain clearly separate.' A sect is an 
egalitarian and externally impotent collectivity; a caste is a 
status conscious and externally potent collectivity. 
Now before someone else says it, let me say that a group 
like the Friends of the Earth, though it is clearly a sect in 
terms of this definition, is not impotent; if it were, there 
would probably be no need for an organisation such as SE2. The 
difference between the FOE and a life sect (like the Amish or the 
Jonestown Commune) is that the members look to their group for only 
a part of their life support, not for it all. The same sort of 
thing is true for most of the caste-like groups we will be looking 
at - the collectivity has relevance for only a part of the lives 
of each of its members. It is in order to maintain this distinc- 
tion between the total commitment of the members of life sects and 
life castes and the tendency or bias of the group members we will 
be looking at that I choose the terms sectist and caste-ist. 
In a life sect, leaders and followers are in daily fact-to- 
face contact; they are united in their impotence. If impotence 
goes with unity, perhaps power goes with separation? Perhaps 
it is not the sect but just the sect leadership that can acquire 
power? Surprising though this suggestion may seem, it turns out 
to have some substance; the reason sects such as the FOE have 
managed to acquire power lies largely in the separation between 
leaders and followers. 
Many sects have a Washington-based leadership and a 
provincial mail-order membership. On top of this, the sect 
leaders (unlike their followers) have impressive media skills. 
At the SE2 meeting the~e were many moans about the anti-nuclear 
bias of the media and frequent laments about the Devil having 
all the best tunes. Nor does it stop there. The Devil, it 
seems, has all the pretty faces too; the antis have Jane Fonda, 
Paul Newnlan and Linda Ronstadt, to name but three, whilst the 
pros have only the bushy-browed Ed Teller - the Father of the 
H-bomb. The sect leaders are thus able to do two things at once 
in two different places - they can put pressure on government 
in Washington at the same time that they feed suitably sectist 
exhortations back to the provinces to maintain the unity of their 
fissure-prone followers. 
For instance, the FOE book Frozen  F i r e  opens with the 
following quote: 
An official of one of the country's largest gas 
companies said yesterday 'absolute safety' for 
liquefied natural gas is impossible and 'inconsistent 
with national goals and public interest' . '6 
Only those of a sectist disposition would see this statement as 
anything other than a platitudinous truism; those in other 
social contexts (be they caste-ists, savage beasts of capitalism, 
hermits or down-trodden proletariat) would all agree that no 
technology can be absolutely safe and that, in consequence, a 
commitment to absolute safety would be infinitely expensive and 
so could never be consistent with national goals or public 
interest. The various non-sectists only begin to disagree when 
they get to the next question which is: 'granted that no 
technology can be absolutely safe, how safe is safe enough?' 
Since the remaining 298 pages of F r o z e n  F i r e  are devoted to a 
detailed and meticulously argued discussion of this second 
question, culminating in a long list of suggestions as to how 
these inevitable risks might be better minimized and more 
carefully and equitably handled,l? one can only assume that this 
opening appeal to the uncompromising rejection of risk 
(especially risk imposed by big business) is a sectist sop thrown 
to the faithful followers to keep them happy while the author 
hobnobs on what are really rather caste-ist terms, with those who 
tread the corridors of power. 
A powerful sect is a colossal contradiction, and this two- 
places-at-once feat by its leaders must inevitably result in 
a lot of skillfully disguised hypocrisy. The greater the power 
of the sect leadership, the greater its separation from its 
followers, and the greater this separation becomes, the harder 
the leadership will have to work to create the illusion that it 
does not exist. This contradiction, without doubt, is the 
Archilles' heel of power-wielding sect leaders (the 'Porsche 
populists' as they have been dubbed) and without doubt it is 
the weak spot on which a caste-ist group such as SE2 should 
concentrate its attack. ' 
The third factor that has enabled these sect leaders to 
wield so much power (thL? first two being their separation from 
their followers and their media skills) has been the eagerness 
of government to listen to them. Instead of performing its proper 
(from a caste-ist point of view) role of referee, government 
has failed time and time again to blow the whistle while the sects 
went on and on inventing their own rules. It is here that the 
American experience with the anti-nuclear movement (and other 
movements, like the anti-smoking movement) differs so markedly 
from those in ~ u r 0 ~ e . I ~  In the hope of finding out why this 
should be so, I turned to a political scientist. 
In American history, the Radical, although the founder 
of party is also its most persistent critic. Forever 
disillusioned with the actual tones in which party 
speaks, he seeks to eliminate interference by bosses, 
corruption and special interests and to tune in the 
authentic voice of the people by regulating party 
processes, by setting up a direct primary, by instituting 
the initiative and the referendum. The strength of the 
Radical ideal in America is one major reason for the 
weakness of our parties. 20  
America currently seems to be suffering from an excess of this 
Radical ideal. By contrast, some European countries (France, 
Sweden, Britain, Austria, for instance) though of course they 
have their strenuous internal disagreements about nuclear power, 
do seem to be able to make some progress21 and this is because 
in their various ways, their governments do blow the whistle - 
they do not allow the sects to go on and on changing the rules. 
They are not wholly convinced that, when the sect leaders speak, 
they speak with 'the authentic voice of the people'. 
From Analysis to Prescription 
If this is the current predicament, what can SE2 do about 
it? How can it induce American government to exercise some of 
this healthy scepticism? 
1. SE2 can probably do very little directly to lever 
government away from the sects but it can, in its 
lobbying, point out that, since sects are uncompromising 
in their demands and are not prepared to enter into 
negotiation whilst politicians are in the business of 
compromise and negotiation, too close an association 
with sects nay not be in a ~olitician's long-tern 
interest. 
2. SE2 can probably do quite a lot to reveal to both 
government andthe populace that the voice of the 
sect leader is not 'the authentic voice of the people'. 
Since the sect leaders make much of their moral righ- 
teousness, their hypocrisy (if it can be revealed) 
could well prove to be their political undoing. Yuch 
more thought would be needed to develop the appropriate 
tactics for applying this strategy but here are a few 
suggestions: 
a) SE2 should not, in frustration, try to adopt the tactics 
of the other side. Their tactics are suited to their 
strategy and would not work well in the cause of a 
different strategy. 
b) Healthy scepticism is a very effective weapon in the 
journalist's armoury and several good examples of its 
application to the New Class already exist.22 Ridicule 
is a most effective medium and a well-chosen epithet, 
like 'Porsche populist', is worth a hundred pages of 
analysis. 
C) The two great unifying themes of a sect secure inside 
its wall of virtue are: 'Small is beautiful' and 
'natural is good'. The sectist component of the 
anti-nuclear movement is vulnerable on both these 
scores. First, its own organisation at the leadership 
end is massive and only the media skills of the 
Washington-based leaders prevent the followers from 
perceiving that this is so. Second, I was most im- 
pressed at the meeting to learn that so much of what 
is involved in nuclear power is SO technologically 
simple (in principle, anyway) and so natural. The sun 
is a huge reactor (but well sited, admittedly), there 
have been natural reactors on earth millions of years 
ago in Gabon, radiation is natural and there has 
always been background radiation - sometimes higher 
sometimes lower than at present ... radiation in the 
proper medical hands is good for you. In particular, 
the Swedish waste disposal system, with its absence of 
moving parts, the way it fits itself into natural 
processes that extend through aeons of time, and its 
imitation of nature as, for instance, in using copper 
containers because native copper has been present in 
the granite from the time it was created, has an 
enormous spiritual impact through its simplicity and 
its respect for nature and for creation. It contains 
a powerful theme that would have inspired Wordsworth! 
So, other things being equal, always go for the option 
that is simplest and that imitates, rather than masters, 
nature. 
3) Implicit in 1 )  and 2) above is a major shift in 
strategy: a redefinition of who SE2's enemies are. 
At present, SE2 tends to see itself opposed by a 
monolithic enemy: the anti-nuclear movement. But 
this anthropological analysis reveals that the anti- 
nuclear groups are not all the same and, equipped with 
it, SE2 can now discriminate between the castes and 
the sects. Castes and sects are not natural allies. 
Castes negotiate, compromise, value scientific knowledge 
and respect expertise. Sects refuse to negotiate, will 
not compromise, value scientific knowledge o n l y  when 
it upholds their position, and, being committed to 
egalitarianism, suspect expertise. Sects go for 
quantity, castes for quality.23 So, by these criteria, 
SE2 is itself a caste and therefore has much more in 
common with ar? anti-nuclear caste such as the Sierra 
Club than the Sierra Club has with a sect within its 
own movement - the Friends of the Earth for instance. 
Let me give an example. 
Theze is in Britain (and I suspect in the US too) 
a group of lawyers opposed to nuclear power because 
they believe that the security measures that will have 
to be taken to minimise the threat posed by the non-state 
aggressor will result in Britain moving towards a police 
state. Now lawyers, in Britain anyhow, are not terribly 
sectist people - they are professionals, their arguments 
stand or fall according to whether the evidence is (by 
the caste-ist rules of evidence) sound or false, ... 
they wear sober suits and old school ties. Such a 
group becores aligned with the hairy anti-nuclear sects 
largely because of the reaction of the pro-nuclear 
people. But these lawyers are not opposed to nuclear 
power per se (as, for instance, is the FOE leader Arnory 
Lovins). They are opposed to certain types of reactor 
which they believe bring with them as unacceptably high 
security risk. They do not want the end of nuclear 
power - just a rearrangement of the present reactor 
preferences. They, for their part, could benefit from 
SE2's technical expertise in arriving at a more accurate 
assessment of the security risks posed by different 
reactors (and other techniques such as reprocessing and 
waste disposal) whilst SE2 could, in return, concede 
the validity of the lawyers1 legal and social concerns 
and add them to the technical criteria that they already 
apply in their considered evaluations of the various 
reactors and techniques. 
What I am suggesting is that SE2 should identify 
these caste-ist (or potentially caste-ist) anti-nuclear 
groups and begin to make friends with them (on the basis 
of what they already have in common). In so doing, SE2 
would move them further towards the caste pole, would 
drive a wedge.between them and the sects, and would itself 
become a much less isolated target for anti-nuclear 
attack. As such links were forged, government would 
begin to see the advantages of listening to the considered, 
orderly and coherent counsels of the cautious but pro- 
gressive castes rather than to the increasingly fractured, 
strident and hysterical demands of the uncompromising 
and regressive sects. America would begin to recover 
from its institutional paralysis. 
Finally, I should point out that, though these prescriptions 
are all based on the assumption that it would be a good thing if 
America were to recover from its institutional paralysis, such an 
assumption is not built into the analysis. The analysis just 
tells you what you can have; it is up to you to decide what you 
would like. If you are of the more revolutionary opinion that 
such tinkering is a waste of time and that the only solution is 
to hasten the inevitable and total collapse of the whole wretched 
system then you will be interested in a rather different set of 
prescriptions and, if you feed in these contrary assumptions as 
to what is a good thing and what is a bad thing, the analysis will 
generate that appropriate set of prescriptions for you. A cynic 
might object that there is no need to go to all this trouble to 
find out what these prescriptions might be - we only have to look 
at current United States policy! 
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